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Since the emergence of HIV/AIDS and SARS, Thailand has understood the security 
threat posed by disease and has responded by investing in the country’s disease 
control infrastructure, such as through the development of the Field Epidemiology 
Training Programme (FETP), improving pandemic preparedness, and collaborating 
with other states, international organizations, non-governmental organizations and 
private initiatives to ensure health security. This has led to the creation of a multi-
stakeholder subregional governance network for disease control. However, 
underpinning this network is the individual transformation of Thailand, which, 
beyond acting as a norm entrepreneur, has scaled up its activities in disease control 
to become a would-be leader in disease control in mainland Southeast Asia. By using 
Lake’s conceptions of hierarchy and Nolte’s understanding of regional power, this 
article shows how Thailand has taken on this leadership role and has been able to 
dominate the normative processes of subregional disease control and in doing so has 
strengthened its own economic and national security. Moreover, this article draws 
conclusions for regional governance more broadly, through examining power 
dynamics between states within the arrangement. 
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Southeast Asia, and Thailand in particular, has often been referred to as a potential 
“hot zone” or hub of emerging infectious diseases.1 This has been attributed to a 
multiplicity of factors including: a greater concentration and connectivity of livestock, 
persons and products with unsafe animal husbandry practices;
2
 a lack of development 
coupled with population growth and urbanization;
3
 problems with effective 
governance of infectious disease;
4
 and increasing interconnectivity in the region due 
to improved transportation links.  
Pandemic potential in Southeast Asia has been framed as a security threat,
5
 
and Thailand has also recognized the implications of disease for transnational 
security. Most evident has been the impact of “crisis” events which have changed 
Thai policy in this area to reflect shifting understandings of disease and security. The 
first of these was the impact of human immunodeficiency virus infection and acquired 
immune deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS). Thailand recognized the implications of 
the virus for the country’s national security through its impact on travel and trade.6 
This framing promoted a proactive policy pathway to limit the disease’s spread 
through a series of campaigns such as the 100 per cent condom campaign,
7
 scaling up 
access to antiretroviral drugs
8
 and normalizing discussions of family planning through 
initiatives like the Cabbages and Condoms restaurant.
9
 Accordingly, Thailand has 
been touted as one of the “success stories” of state responses to HIV/AIDS.10 
However, taking into account the pivotal role of tourism in Thailand’s economy, a 
critical view could consider such efforts in HIV/AIDS control as having been 
undertaken to protect the country’s economic security.11 
In 2002-03, the spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) 
represented a further key moment for understanding Thailand’s infectious disease 
policy, similar to the “tipping point” it proved to be for regional activity in disease 
control.
12
 Although Thailand only reported a few cases (resulting in two deaths),
13
 the 
government made every effort to promote Thailand as a zero-transmission SARS 
country.
14
 Despite the low impact SARS had on Thailand, it was Bangkok’s 
leadership that was instrumental in summoning the involvement of its regional 
counterparts in a series of special Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN)+3 meetings culminating in the region being declared SARS free by June 
2003. This activity was undertaken in an attempt to limit the damage to the tourism 
industry and the wider economy, which occurred elsewhere in Asia such as Hong 
Kong and mainland China. 
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This focus on economic and national security was further evident in the 
outbreak of the H5N1 influenza virus in 2004-05. Despite having laboratory 
confirmation of the circulating virus, the Thai government tried to cover this outbreak 
up for over three months in order to protect its poultry and tourism industries.
15
 This 
approach was exemplified by Deputy Agriculture Minister Newin Chidchob when he 
stated: “the chicken industry would have collapsed immediately and the economy 
would have lost more than 100 billion baht”.16 However, simultaneous to rejecting 
emerging global health norms of prompt reporting and outbreak transparency, 
Thailand took to regional activity, seizing a leadership position for disease control, 
notably by hosting a meeting of ASEAN+3 on how best to control the outbreak, 
culminating in the production of a Joint Ministerial Statement on Prevention and 
Control of Avian Influenza.
17
  
By regionalizing the risk of disease, Thailand demonstrated that only a 
collective response would combat its spread. In taking the agency to establish such 
regional activity, Thailand placed itself at the centre of discussions on how to respond 
to the threat posed by the disease. Such action is indicative of Thailand’s efforts for 
regional and subregional preponderance in disease control, which have visibly 
increased in the last 15 years through a range of formal and informal mechanisms, to 
the extent that Thailand can now be considered a subregional disease governor, 
arguably extending its own sovereign power in this arena beyond its borders. 
 Thailand’s activity in disease control raises important questions for 
understanding regional governance of disease more broadly. While recent academic 
literature has used Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink’s conceptions of norm 
entrepreneurs and norm cascade in global health governance to explain how ideas and 
expectations of health security spread among actors in disease control,
18
 this article 
seeks to push this approach one step further by considering the role of individual state 
agency in the propagation of disease control expectations. Traditionally more 
powerful regional states have been expected to take care of their own backyard in a 
necessarily benevolent manner, to provide stability and peace within their 
geographical spheres of influence.
19
 Thailand, as one of the most materially and 
economically powerful states in mainland Southeast Asia, has arguably become the de 
facto leader in discussions regarding collaborative subregional disease surveillance 
and response efforts. This article considers Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and 
Vietnam as a subregion of Southeast Asia (also known as mainland Southeast Asia).
20
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To some extent, this realizes the requirements of the World Health 
Organization (WHO)’s International Health Regulations 2005 (IHR (2005)) which 
strongly encourages states to provide each other with technical cooperation and 
logistical support for capacity building in disease control.
21
 While formal regional 
organizations for disease control have been a regular feature in contemporary global 
health, such as regional offices of the WHO, Thailand’s quasi-creation of a 
subregional grouping in this informal manner represents a new departure for 
understanding global health. However, this article argues that Thailand’s assertions in 
disease control are not only undertaken to improve the subregion’s health, but also to 
allow Thailand to protect its own national and economic security from the threat of 
disease, as initiated through their approach to HIV/AIDS, SARS and H5N1 control.  
Using the work of David Lake on hierarchy,
22
and Detlef Nolte on regional 
power,
23
 as a theoretical framework to understand regional governance, this article 
demonstrates how Thailand has scaled up its disease control activity beyond its 
borders to assume a position of subregional disease governor. This governance 
arrangement has been welcomed by Thailand’s neighbours in mainland Southeast 
Asia as it has increased their capacity to respond to an outbreak, and meet their 
normative obligations to global health security.  
 
Methodology 
 
The findings of this article are drawn from elite semi-structured interviews with a 
range of policymakers involved in disease control in Thailand, Cambodia, Laos and 
Vietnam. Interview participants were identified through document and Internet 
searches, followed by snowball sampling, after making initial contact with an 
individual in each ministry of health. Policymakers were contacted by email and 
asked to participate in the research, having been sent detailed information about the 
research project and a list of sample questions. Interviews were recorded, where 
consent was given, or notes taken. Content analysis was conducted on the interview 
transcripts, to identify key themes and policy aims from each country. This interview 
content was then triangulated with policy documents from Thailand’s Ministry of 
Public Health (MOPH) and its subregional counterparts, as well as other global and 
disease control actors, such as (but not limited to) the WHO, America’s Centers for 
Disease Control (CDC) and the Asian Development Bank.  
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Moving Beyond the Norm Entrepreneurs 
 
Current literature on global heath governance and global disease control focuses on 
the role of norms in explaining state activity with global health security. Governments 
are expected to comply with new standards of behaviour for minimizing infectious 
disease, as codified in the WHO’s IHR (2005) and have instigated the necessary 
structural changes to their national public health provision to reflect this.
24
 Based on 
the work on Finnemore and Sikkink,
25
 the assumption is that states act in accordance 
with global social expectations, and this includes how they should report outbreaks of 
disease, implement the IHR (2005) and concern themselves with global health 
security. Working within this norm life cycle, Sara Davies, Adam Kamradt-Scott and 
Simon Rushton
26
 suggest that within the global health space there exist norm 
entrepreneurs that propose how states should act in global disease control and 
convince others to commit to a collective security framework. Once several states 
have accepted a norm proposed by such entrepreneurs, such as improving surveillance 
and response mechanisms, this norm is considered to have cascaded amid states and 
becomes embedded within the architecture of global health governance which then 
becomes the expected behaviour by which all states are judged.  
Using such a framework, Thailand could be considered as a subregional norm 
entrepreneur, as it offers mainland Southeast Asian states an example for how to 
understand disease—in terms of national and economic security—and a model of 
technical /financial support for how to implement public health provisions in 
surveillance, prevention, reporting and response to limit the spread of diseases. 
Southeast Asian countries have already accepted the need for outbreak transparency 
and the importance of global health security.
27
 Global norms for disease control have 
cascaded and been internalized from global actors such as the WHO.
28
 As such, this 
framework may not be suitable for understanding the dynamic role of Thailand as a 
subregional disease governor, as this normative agenda is not generated at this level 
of analysis.  
 Moreover, the norm life cycle framework for understanding state activity in 
disease control misses the important nuance of an individual state’s agency and 
influence in a regional grouping. Thailand does not only encourage its neighbours to 
behave in accordance with its normative perception of disease control as a norm 
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entrepreneur, but simultaneously actively participates and directly involves itself in 
the disease control of other states beyond that which might be expected or justified in 
an anarchical structure of regional disease control. A theoretical basis for 
understanding this governing, beyond norm entrepreneurship, is through 
consideration of regional hierarchy, based on the work of Lake on regional power and 
developed by Nolte.  
Regional Hierarchy 
Firstly, for a country to become a regional or subregional disease governor, it is 
important to challenge the concept of anarchy at the regional level. As Lake 
suggests,
29
 it is a fallacy to assume that all the relationships within regional systems 
are anarchic. Secondly, the creation of a subregional governance framework whereby 
Thailand is at the centre is not an objective fact, but is produced and reproduced by 
the interactions of states themselves and through the self-identification as such by the 
regional power.
30
 This approach is centred on the concept of relational authority, 
which rests on a bargain between the “governor” and the “governed” premised on the 
former’s provision of a social order of value sufficient to offset the latter’s loss of 
freedom to reach an equilibrium in a regional network.
31
 This mimics Nolte’s 
conjuncture that a regional leader must provide collective goods for the region,
32
 and 
that it must be accepted by its neighbours as performing this leadership position. In 
this instance, Thailand, the governor state, offers disease control resources to its 
neighbours who in turn relinquish some of their sovereign power in the control of 
information about their pathogenic status.  
A hierarchical relationship then becomes contingent on the performance of the 
prevailing state providing social order to its subsidiaries, and having the internal 
structure and material resources to do so.
33
 Thailand must demonstrate that it is able 
to support subregional counterparts in disease control activities, and this in turn 
legitimates the hierarchal relationship; governed states in turn accept the authority of 
the leader to exert restraints on their behaviours necessary to provide that social order. 
In this instance the social order is the maintenance of global health security. Thailand 
can demand to know about outbreaks occurring in the subregion to enhance economic 
and national security, and its subregional counterparts will be transparent with their 
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disease surveillance—despite there being no legal obligation to do so—to contribute 
to ensuring global health security.   
This leadership also has a normative dimension. A regional leader benefits 
from setting the rules of engagement in ways that reflect its interests, defining the 
world view and regional security agenda and the common project to combat the 
security threat subject to being accepted by a sufficient number of governed states.
34
 
Thailand benefits from the framing of subregional disease control activities in terms 
of the threat they pose to (Thai) national and economic security, and as such define 
the subregional response to disease outbreaks. This is helped by the fact that the 
mainland Southeast Asian states have already internalized a worldview of disease 
control as promoted by the norms of global health security. As the subregional disease 
governor, Thailand is able to ensure that epidemiological practice subregionally 
adheres to its standards and its conceptions of disease, and that Thailand will be 
rapidly informed about any potential disease threat in the subregion.  
Similarly, regional states recognize the leading position of another, but 
typically only for something in return, most often protection from internal or external 
threats, such as, in this instance, infectious disease.
35
 There are three reasons why a 
state would willingly enter into such a regional governance arrangement.  
Firstly, governed states depend on governor states for a measure of social 
order (the maintenance of health security), and having received protection from the 
governor state, they themselves do not need to divert scarce resources to this area. It 
follows, therefore, that countries in hierarchical security relationships, all else held 
constant, spend fewer of their own resources on security and rely more on the efforts 
of their protector.
36
 In mainland Southeast Asia, states which are quasi-governed by 
Thailand for disease control have not channelled vast resources to meet global health 
security standards.
37
 Whether this is due to funding shortfalls, capacity, or a desire to 
concede this area of responsibility to Thailand the net result is the same, allowing the 
subregional power relationship to manifest itself.  
Secondly, governor states are significantly more likely to come to the aid of 
their regional counterparts.
38
 For example, Thailand has sent its Surveillance and 
Rapid Response Teams (SRRTs) to Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos to undertake 
epidemiological study and outbreak response when rumours of disease have 
emerged.
39
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Thirdly, the governor state helps the governed to meet the general standards of 
international behaviour.
40
 While subregional states have internalized the norms of 
global health security, they lack the ability to implement these fully. For example, a 
review of compliance with these core competencies of the IHR (2005) showed that 
governed states in Southeast Asia had not yet met these requirements.
41
 However, 
subsequently, these states have been able to evidence subregional arrangements with 
Thailand, demonstrating that the epidemiological resources are available for them to 
use, as part of this hierarchical network, and they are taking strides towards 
implementing their normative expectations at the global level.
42
 In spite of these 
reasons why governed states may comply, demonstrating this compliance can be 
challenging.
43
 
Thus, it is difficult to distinguish whether this governance relationship is based 
on domination by Thailand or cooperation with its subregional counterparts. Yet, 
when understanding a hierarchal relationship based on relational authority, then this 
relationship can be said to be both of these.
44
 Relational authority represents a social 
contract between a ruler—who provides a social order of value to the ruled—and the 
ruled who comply with the ruler’s commands necessary to the production of that 
order.
45
 Thailand makes efforts to dominate subregional disease governance in the 
maintenance of global health security, and these efforts are accepted and reproduced 
by the governed states as they understand the benefits they derive from ensuring 
global health security through this subregional governance framework. By using a 
social approach to authority, any obligation in this hierarchy does not “follow from 
the ruler to the ruled”, but as a bargain between these two actors.46 Moreover, this 
relational authority is not total, but a continuous dynamic variable, dependent on 
context. Thailand may possess authority over its governed states in some areas of 
disease control, as will be illustrated below, and not in other areas which remain 
beyond expectations of compliance. These areas of authority may not be restricted to 
disease control; Thailand has created a similar governance arrangement for economic 
cooperation,
47
 environmental concerns,
48
 and dominance over water resource 
management in the subregion.
49
 
 
Regional Governance 
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Based on the framework suggested by Lake and Nolte, understanding Thailand as a 
subregional disease governor relies on the supposition of a subregion as a unit in the 
emerging regional architecture of world politics.
50
 Such a collection of states has been 
defined in several ways, including “a collective cognitive, socially constructed entity 
as well as a territorial one”,51 “a bridge for the gaps at national level by developing 
collective regional solutions to common challenges”,52 or a collective intersubjective 
formulation whereby “national interests come to be understood as best met and 
protected through collective action and compliance with norms that reflect and sustain 
the regional community”.53 Often, such regional groupings can also be considered in 
terms of regional security complex theory
54
 or regional security communities
55
 with 
states conceiving of sharing certain security externalities, such as the threat posed by 
infectious disease, that arise from a common geographic area and have consciously or 
unconsciously chosen to construct a regional mechanism to combat the threat.
56
 As 
highlighted by Jürgen Haake
57
 and Amitav Acharya,
58
 Southeast Asia is more likely 
to localize such activity rather than adopt global norms wholesale, so it is 
unsurprising that (sub)regional states may favour (sub)regional coordinated activity.  
Reflecting broader trends of regionalism, regional organizations have scaled 
up their activities in disease control, sharing strong converging reciprocal interests in 
addressing the risk of outbreaks, allowing a reconfiguration and expansion of the 
nature of regional security cooperation among Southeast Asian states.
59
 It was 
initially through these organizations that Thailand was able to scale up its regional 
activities to play a critical role in regional disease control.
60
 
For example, during the SARS and H5N1 outbreaks, Thailand actively pushed 
other ASEAN+3 states to appreciate that the region was increasingly interconnected 
by disease threats—an ASEAN disease security community.61 Consequentially this 
regional grouping established a range of mechanisms for health cooperation ensuring 
multi-sectorial regional protocols for pandemic preparedness. These were formulated 
at a number of ASEAN+3 meetings, many of which have often been hosted by 
Thailand, and notably included a regional meeting on H5N1 that produced the 
ASEAN+3 Joint Ministerial Statement on Prevention and Control of Avian 
Influenza.
62
 Moreover, this ASEAN+3 hub has developed the ASEAN+3 Field 
Epidemiology Training Network, which has its permanent office in Thailand, with the 
support of the Thai MOPH.
63
 Thailand was also pivotal in the development of a 
regional strategic framework to collectively address the risks posed by infectious 
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disease control and simultaneously meet IHR (2005) obligations and strengthen health 
security: the Asia Pacific Strategy for Emerging Disease (APSED).
64
  
Thailand has also played a key role in other formalized regional disease 
control activity, such as initiating the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
forum role in disease control, which has established a health working group aimed at 
enhancing and strengthening health security for member states; the APEC Emerging 
Infections Network (APEX EINet).
65
 Likewise Thailand has dominated the 
development of the Ayeyawady Chao Phraya Mekong Economic Cooperation 
Strategy (ACMECS), promoting regional disease control as a regional public good to 
which all member states should contribute in order to promote development and 
economic stability.
66
  
These regional governance activities have not just appeared amid multilateral 
institutional settings, but networks have also emerged informally. A pertinent 
example is the Mekong Basin Disease Surveillance (MBDS) network, a subregional 
network for communication between departments of disease control, improving cross 
border infectious disease outbreak surveillance and response, to limit the spread of 
infectious disease in mainland Southeast Asia.
67
 Importantly for this analysis, it is 
Thailand that hosts this network in the MOPH, where it is formally registered, and, 
moreover, has been pivotal in its success, through its support in the technical 
development of the epidemiological systems and hosting a number of events to get 
health professionals together under the MBDS umbrella to foster greater trust and 
understanding.
68
 
It could be deduced that Thailand’s involvement in regional governance 
mechanisms have only been in areas where the state has been able to exercise a high 
degree of control in setting the agenda. While other states in the region showed strong 
convergence over maintaining the social order of global health security,
69
 it can be 
argued that the ultimate motive for Thailand’s involvement in such regional initiatives 
is to allow it to further its broader geostrategic ambitions
70
 or ensure its own national 
and economic security through dominating the normative approach to disease control, 
being in a position to garner more information about diseases occurring regionally 
and in doing so, its transformation into a would-be regional disease governor.  
 
The Transformation of Thailand into a SubrRegional Disease Governor 
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As noted, several mainland Southeast Asian countries consider Thailand as a 
subregional leader for disease control and a model for their surveillance and response 
systems.
71
 Thailand has been able to foster this identity not only through its 
involvement in regional organizations, but further through transforming its state-
based disease control activities into subregional efforts as the subregional disease 
governor. This can be evidenced through five key facets of Thailand’s disease control 
activity. 
Firstly, Thailand has invested heavily in the creation of an internationally 
acclaimed infectious disease surveillance and response training programme. In 1980 
the MOPH, in collaboration with the WHO and the CDC, established the first Field 
Epidemiology Training Program (FETP) outside North America.
72
 This visionary 
move aimed to enhance human capacity for disease surveillance, response, 
investigation and control in Thailand and neighbouring countries.
73
 Through this, 
Thai nationals were trained in advanced epidemiological methods and how to combat 
any potential outbreak—thus limiting any national security or economic fallout of an 
emerging infectious disease—to maintain social order. Accordingly, the alumni from 
this programme “have provided the backbone of epidemiological surveillance and 
broader public health responses in Thailand”.74  
Interestingly, since 2001 this programme has included numbers of foreign 
nationals from the subregion in the training of this (Thai) public health curriculum, 
which was renamed the International Field Epidemiology Training Program (IFETP) 
in 1998. More recently, this is in spite of some subregional states having their own 
national epidemiology programmes, including Laos and Cambodia. Beyond the 
IFETP, Thailand also conducts short training courses in disease control for 
subregional health workers who do not have the capacity to take the whole training 
programme.
75
 The result of this investment has been that public health professionals 
from neighbouring states have been taught in Thai epidemiological methods, and in 
doing so understand disease control as Thailand does, i.e. in terms of national 
security. While this frame reflects the global trend for conceptualizing infectious 
disease, this domination of the type of knowledge taught in these courses emulates 
Lake’s theory of hierarchy and Nolte’s consideration of normative leadership. 
Thailand offers epidemiological education as part of its provision of social order to 
subregional states, and, in return, these states legitimate Thailand’s dominance by 
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implementing similar normative understandings of disease; the framing of disease as a 
security threat and maintaining similar epidemiological practice in their national 
health infrastructures. Most practically, this can be seen in the creation of 
Surveillance and Rapid Response Teams (SRRTs) in Laos and Cambodia, based on 
the example set by Thailand’s public health infrastructure.  
Moreover, foreign alumni of the IFETP remain in contact with the Thai 
officials and thus Thailand maintains direct (yet informal) communication with public 
health colleagues in subregional health ministries, who can share information of 
potential outbreaks occurring in their own states.
76
 Moreover, IFETP students are 
closely involved in the MBDS mechanism, further consolidating this relationship.
77
 
Accordingly Thailand enjoys an increasingly more networked position compared to 
other states in the subregion. This puts Thailand in an unrivalled position for 
subregional outbreak awareness, and such information accumulation allows Thailand 
to remain at the apex of subregional disease governance and use any information 
collected to protect its domestic security interests.  
Secondly, Thailand maintains one of the best reference laboratories in the 
region, alongside those in Singapore, Japan and Malaysia.
78
 Through this reference 
laboratory (located in the MOPH), Thailand is able to rapidly identify any pathogens 
occurring within its borders. Under the IHR (2005), each state is supposed to have 
their own reference laboratory facilities, yet as Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar have 
not been able to achieve this, they have increasingly sent their disease samples to 
Thailand for diagnostic testing, and have used this facility as part of their reporting 
compliance under IHR (2005).
79
 Cambodia, Laos and Myanmar are thus able to show 
the WHO that they have use of subregional reference laboratories to confirm diseases, 
and thus they comply with the global normative and regulatory requirements, if not 
within their own territory. This reflects Lake’s understanding that a governor state 
helps its ancillaries meet international standards of behaviour.
80
   
Interestingly, in the wake of the Indonesian virus sharing controversy,
81
 states 
have chosen to send their virus samples to Thailand, rather than to a WHO reference 
laboratory, or a CDC laboratory (which are active in the region) or any other non-state 
scientific organization (such as Institut Pasteur or the Robert Koch Institute).
82
 
Through such faculty, Thailand has furthered its position as the subregional leader as 
each of the other states has sought to use Thai services in order to identify outbreaks 
occurring in the subregion rather than accepted global leaders. The recognition of 
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Thailand as a subregional disease governor becomes ever more apparent as 
subregional actors are able to benefit from the material scientific resources of 
Thailand to gather pathogenic intelligence. Thus Thailand extends its sovereign 
control in both the areas of training public health professionals, and offering services 
which should fall to states to perform, such as laboratory capabilities.  
Yet, beyond the altruistic, this collective use of the reference laboratory 
creates an unusual power dynamic in the subregion. By undertaking the diagnostics, 
Thailand has unrivalled knowledge of its neighbour’s pathogenic status prior to 
official inter-state or global reporting, placing it in a position to dominate the 
subregional response to any outbreak, as well as protect its own national and 
economic security interests. One key area of convergence in understanding 
hierarchical relationships is that governed states complicity cede some of their 
sovereign authority to the governor state. Equally important to this laboratory power 
relationship is the fact that if Thailand identified diseases occurring in the subregion, 
it could put pressure on the reporting relationship between that state and the WHO 
(under the IHR (2005)). While Thailand will type the pathogen, it will be up to the 
member state where the pathogen was found to report this outbreak to the WHO. 
There could be instances where transparent reporting from a subregional state was not 
forthcoming, and knowing that Thailand is aware of the disease outbreak (through this 
increasing subregional hierarchal dynamic) may encourage the infected state to fulfil 
their obligations under the IHR (2005).
83
 This relationship could highlight the 
coercive aspect of a regional governance framework, that through this power dynamic 
a governor state maintains the authority to punish non-compliance with international 
standards of behaviour,
84
 such as through the “naming and shaming” of a state’s 
failure to meet normative expectations of global health security.
85
 However, to date 
there is no example of this occurring, which is why the delineation of the subregional 
governance relationship as hegemonic is not suitable.
86
  
Thirdly, Thailand’s disease surveillance infrastructure functions beyond the 
borders of the state and is able to detect outbreaks in other states. As the materially 
and economic preponderant state in the subregion, Thailand enjoys a much more 
comprehensive disease surveillance programme than its neighbours, both in terms of 
effective training as well as resources. As a consequence, a neighbouring state may 
not have detected a circulating pathogen until it has reached the Thai border, where it 
is then identified by the Thai surveillance apparatus. This became apparent during the 
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outbreak of H5N1 in 2007 when a girl infected with the virus was not diagnosed in 
her home state, Laos, but only when her family took her across the border to Nong 
Khai in northern Thailand for medical attention.
87
 While this illustrates the lack of 
surveillance in Laos, it also suggests, importantly, that Thailand is able to have an 
influence on assessing viral status beyond its borders.  
Moreover, with the recent paradigm shift for collaborative working at the sub 
regional and regional (or global level) for infectious disease control,
88
 there are 
numerous Thai public health teams working in Myanmar undertaking both disease 
surveillance and response activities.
89
 Likewise, there are increasingly joint 
investigations between SRRTs from Thailand working across the border alongside 
their counterparts in Laos and Cambodia.
90
 As Lake suggests, a hierarchal 
relationship can be evidenced through “boots on the ground” in a governed state, and 
this example of public health professionals working internationally further suggests 
this subregional governance network is based on hierarchy.
91
 Through these activities, 
and influenced by the vast disparities in resources for disease surveillance, Thailand is 
able to ascertain the prevalence of a potential outbreak occurring externally, and 
before another subregional state has detected it. This represents the development of a 
hierarchal relationship where states, whether they are willing or not, share some of 
their sovereign duties in identifying pathogens to Thailand.
92
 It could be considered 
that Thailand is acting as a responsible state, focused on the provision of subregional 
public goods for disease control,
93
 and supporting other states to meet their global 
surveillance obligations under IHR (2005).
94
 However, another interpretation may be 
that Thailand supports its neighbouring states through human resource development 
(such as IFETP), use of reference laboratories and functional surveillance capabilities 
in an effort to further its own national and economic security, ensuring that it is aware 
of any pathogenic presence occurring in the subregion. This would then allow 
Thailand the forewarning to take any steps it might deem necessary to protect the 
state, population or economy from the potential impact of trade and travel 
restrictions.
95
  
Fourth, Thailand is able to dominate the subregional discourse of disease 
control as it is one of the only states in Southeast Asia engaged in South-South 
regional and sub-regional development cooperation.
96
 Thailand has developed the 
International Partnership for Development Program which supports new initiatives to 
enhance South-South cooperation within the region (and beyond) in areas of health 
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and disease prevention.
97
 This has included HIV/AIDS prevention, participation in 
international public health networks, providing expert referral services e.g. laboratory 
services, building influenza diagnostic capacity in Myanmar and sharing knowledge 
and experience of management of a host of infectious diseases including H1N1 with 
the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka.
98
 Through this South-South development 
cooperation, Thailand has further dominated the frame of reference, types of 
epidemiological practice and methods for the building of capacity in disease control 
in the states to whom it offers assistance, and even to those states beyond its 
immediate neighbourhood. This follows from Lake’s argument of a governor state 
providing social order to their counterparts.
99
 The social order favouring global health 
security is thus carried across into the aid recipient states.  
As with the IFETP, Thai development officials are based in the health 
ministries of these states to implement these development programmes. Accordingly, 
Thailand will have insight into health concerns which might be occurring within these 
states ensuring their continued national and economic security protection from the 
threat of disease. In particular, the two overarching initiatives that Thailand promotes 
as part of its health development agenda are: first, addressing the least developed 
countries needs in health provision; and second, ensuring access to modern 
technology for these states.
100
 Maintaining the social order of global health security is 
reliant upon improved surveillance protocols in the region and beyond. By improving 
access to digital technology, this will lead to improved disease reporting through 
MBDS or digital disease reporting. Thus, Thailand would be able to obtain disease-
relevant information even more promptly and ensure continued health security, while 
appearing to altruistically be supporting other states in the region through 
development assistance.  
Finally, Thailand has been able to take a governing role in subregional disease 
control due to the country’s physical location and its economic and material 
development in comparison with other states in the subregion.  Thailand is (relatively) 
central geographically to mainland Southeast Asia, as well as offering excellent 
transport connections and a subregional and regional travel hub.
101
 Accordingly, a 
number of other organizations involved in Southeast Asian disease control have 
located their headquarters in Bangkok, including the Rockefeller Foundation, 
USAID’s Regional Mission and the World Bank. More interesting still, the office of 
MBDS, and the regional offices of the CDC and WHO, are located physically within 
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Thailand’s MOPH in Nonthaburi, and have essentially been “integrated into the 
political architecture of the Thai government ministry”.102 Not only does the presence 
of these organizations in Thailand represent Lake’s understanding of symbolic 
obeisance, in that Thailand was not chosen by coincidence, but that the positioning of 
these external “neutral” actors in Thailand’s MOPH form the central hub of a regional 
and subregional social order.
103
 This means that Thailand is, to some extent, able to 
develop the agenda of these organizations as they have predominately Thai nationals 
working for them, who have been trained in the normative Thai public health 
approach and as such can influence external actors’ regional activity in disease 
control. Thailand has dominated the theoretical underpinnings of these regional 
networks, including influencing which diseases to focus on, and which 
epidemiological practices and principles should be assumed. As Lake insinuates, the 
governing state is able to reflect its interest in activities of governed states and their 
relationship with third, external parties.
104
 Moreover, Thailand is able to get first-hand 
(informal) information about any disease outbreaks which is sent to these 
organizations (especially CDC and WHO) as it has a network of cooperative staff 
within them ensuring continued health security. In doing so, it further ensures 
compliance from subregional states to ensure they notify Thailand through the various 
mechanisms available of any disease outbreak, knowing that otherwise they may 
become aware of these through the WHO/CDC connection at Nonthaburi.  
These five examples illustrate that Thailand, beyond acting as a subregional 
norm entrepreneur, has exerted its activity in disease control beyond its own borders, 
and has transformed itself into the apex of collective subregional action for 
surveillance and response, as a subregional disease governor. Such a position in 
establishing a subregional disease governorship are mirrored in other areas of health, 
such as provision of universal health coverage,
105
 medical tourism,
106
 and its desire 
for regional dominance in tobacco production.
107
 Yet, as shown, Thailand’s 
involvement in subregional and regional efforts has been in areas where the state has 
had a high degree of discretion in setting the rules of engagement and can be seen to 
be doing so, mimicking its response to HIV/AIDS, SARS and H5N1, to protect its 
own national and economic security.
108
 
 
Constraints  
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Nevertheless, it is important not to over-state the case of Thailand as a subregional 
disease governor, and terminologies of hierarchy and regional power risk doing so. 
For example, this case study of Thailand in subregional disease control does not meet 
the definition of regional power according to Iver Neumann
109
 as it has not considered 
the subregional power’s place on the global scale and its ability to stand up to other 
states in the broader region. As such, instead of stating Thailand’s leadership position 
as an analytical given, a counter position could be to treat Thailand as having 
aspirations for regional disease governance.
110
 This is important as there are other 
states in Southeast Asia which may challenge Thailand’s role as a disease governor, 
including Indonesia and Singapore, and, in the Asia-Pacific, China.  
Moreover, while transforming itself into a subregional disease governor, 
Thailand is constrained by global actors. As with other regional powers, they are often 
influential in their own sphere, but exert little influence on the global scale.
111
 As 
Miriam Prys highlights,
112
 regional powers have to operate within an overarching 
international system determined by the global distribution of power and by 
international institutions. This includes compliance with the normative understandings 
of global health security and the legislative requirements of the IHR (2005).
113
 Yet, 
Thailand while complying with IHR (2005) for the most part, and making efforts as a 
global normative leader in health security through efforts such as the Prince Mahidol 
Award Conference—an annual global conference on global health security—it has 
simultaneously challenged parts of the globalized approach to health.  As predicted by 
Philip Nel and Matthew Stephen,
114
 regional powers play different roles in two plays 
that are playing in the same theatre; that of the prevailing regional power at home, and 
challenging the global order externally. Thailand has appeared to test the global 
rhetoric by contravening some global health norms and pushing for greater national 
policy space.
115
 This has included Thailand’s decision to issue compulsory licences 
for antiretroviral medications,
116
 the inclusion of Thai traditional medicine techniques 
into epidemiological data,
117
 challenging the perceived methodology of Langmuir,
118
 
as well as favouring informal reporting mechanisms and subregional activity between 
neighbouring states rather than full interaction and compliance with formal global 
disease governance. In championing subregional activity, and extending its role as 
subregional disease governor, Thailand could be seen to be challenging the 
overarching system of global disease governance and the status quo of the “the 
entrenched power structure of global health governance whereby economically and 
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politically powerful countries, principally in Europe and North America have had a 
disproportionate influence on the global health agenda”.119 This is where this 
subregional position of governor becomes important. If Thailand commands power 
over its subregional counterparts in disease control and continues to challenge the 
global status quo, we can expect such challenges to receive the support of their 
subregional counterparts, such as Lake’s expectations that “subordinate states follow 
their hierarch into war”,120 potentially allowing such position to take hold in global 
fora with a greater number of states pushing for change.  
This could have wide-reaching implications in the future if there comes a time 
when Thailand’s approach to an outbreak or disease control norms diverges from that 
of the norms of global health governance. This is not conjecture, for as recently as 
2005 Thailand tried to cover up the emergence of H5N1 which flew in the face of the 
normative assumption of outbreak transparency, putting the region (and the rest of the 
world) at risk of an avian influenza epidemic. Moreover, Indonesia, a competing 
regional counterpart, challenged the global normative expectations of disease control 
during the virus sharing controversy, highlighting the power that emerging regional 
powers can have at the global level. As highlighted by Frank Smith,
121
 Indonesia’s 
actions were inconsistent with the norm life cycle understanding of compliance in 
global disease control and showed the importance of state agency within global health 
governance. Indonesia’s actions resulted in notable changes to the global virus 
sharing agreements, and as such it is important to remember that regional powers can 
provide the impetus for normative change at the global level, particularly if they have 
the backing of other states. Indonesia benefited from the support of a number of 
states; Brazil, Iran and the Non-Aligned Movement, creating greater power at the 
global discussion table. Accordingly, this article has hoped to show another 
manifestation of regional power and increased state agency within the global health 
literature, with a readymade group of supporters in mainland Southeast Asia, a 
subregion already identified as a hotspot for future outbreaks.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has considered Thailand’s policy and activity in disease control which has 
transformed the state into a subregional disease governor. While regional 
arrangements for health are not new, such as ASEAN or WHO’s regional grouping of 
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South-East Asia Regional Office (SEARO), the dominance of one state amid formal 
and informal regional and subregional mechanisms for improving disease control 
collectively has not been analyzed thus far. This article has shown that Thailand has 
purposively taken strides to lead regional initiatives and has scaled up its domestic 
activity beyond its borders to position itself at the apex of a subregional disease 
control, as a subregional disease governor, and in doing so furthers its own strategic 
goals of increased economic and national security. This governing relationship has 
not been undertaken solely by Thailand, but the governed states have been complicit 
in the creation of such a governance arrangement as they understand that considerable 
benefits can be derived from Thailand acting as a subregional governor for them to 
meet their global health security obligations. As such, this hierarchal relationship is 
one based on relational authority, where both sides agree to the arrangement. 
Although contemporary global health discourse reflects on the role of norm 
entrepreneurs in leading changes for health security at the global level, analysis of this 
regional and subregional dimension is somewhat new. In the case of Thailand in 
mainland Southeast Asia, the norm life cycle framework does not sufficiently explain 
Thailand’s disease control activity and dominance. Lake’s theory of hierarchy and 
Nolte’s framework of regional power122 provide a clearer conceptual understanding of 
subregional disease governance, with Thailand in a leadership position, providing a 
social order of global health security to subregional states and these states have 
afforded Thailand this position. As such, for a (sub) regional governance mechanism 
to work, it is dependent on both the governor state and the governed states equally to 
sustain a hierarchical relationship based on relational authority. 
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